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BOOST: IMPROVING MINDFULNESS, THINKING, 
AND DIVERSITY 
PETER H. HUANG? 
ABSTRACT 
Many important decisions can be difficult; require focused, 
cognitive attention; produce delayed, noisy feedback; benefit from 
careful and clear thinking; and quite often trigger anxiety, stress, 
and other strong, negative emotions. Much empirical, experimental, 
and field research finds that we often make decisions leading to 
outcomes we judge as suboptimal. These studies have contributed 
to the popularity of the idea of nudging people to achieve better 
outcomes by changing how choices and information are framed and 
presented (also known as choice architecture and information ar-
chitecture). Although choice architecture and information archi-
tecture can nudge people into better outcomes, choice architecture 
and information architecture also assume implicitly or explicitly 
that people’s decision-making competencies are immutable or too 
costly to improve and, therefore, choice architecture and information 
architecture fail to improve people’s decision-making competencies. 
This Article advocates boosts to improve mindfulness, think-
ing, and diversity. Boosts differ from nudges in that boosts aim to 
improve decision-making competencies, instead of just decision-
making outcomes. Mindfulness involves paying attention to life 
in an intentional way as it unfolds moment to moment. Mindful-
ness improves decision-making through many pathways, includ-
ing by reducing stress and negative emotions. Recent economic 
research demonstrates that many cognitive biases exemplify lack 
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of mindfulness about particular aspects of life. Thinking boosts 
include thinking technologies and diversity. Thinking technologies 
involve computer or digital technologies to assist people in their 
thinking. Examples of novel, fun thinking technologies include a 
financial entertainment computer video game where a player is a 
vampire managing a blood bar and planning for retirement, and 
video adventure games designed to teach players to recognize and 
mitigate their cognitive biases. Diversity creates bonuses for or-
ganizations by improving decision-making, creativity, innovation, 
prediction, problem-solving, and productivity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a notable scene from the well-known movie Indiana 
Jones and the Last Crusade,1 a Nazi soldier chooses poorly result-
ing in his death, while Indiana Jones chooses wisely by practicing 
mindfulness and careful thinking resulting in saving Indiana 
Jones’ father’s life. Mindlessness and careless thinking often cause 
people to choose poorly in life and fiction, resulting in tragedy.2 
All of us often face choices that are complex, stressful, and re-
quire careful thinking.3  
Examples of such choices include choices about health, 
healthcare, love, spending, investing, and retirement savings and 
planning.4 Many empirical, experimental, and field studies in 
behavioral economics find that choice contexts often unconsciously 
influence people’s choices.5 This research underlies the currently 
popular idea of nudging people’s choices,6 through choice archi-
tecture, which designs choice contexts to influence people’s choices, 
and information architecture, which designs information presen-
tation to influence people’s choices.7 Behavioral economics also 
finds that people often choose poorly due to unconscious cognitive 
biases.8 Nudges incorporate or take advantage of people’s cogni-
tive biases to nudge people’s choices to different outcomes.9 The 
2017 award of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in economic sciences 
                                                                                                            
1 YouTube Duck Channel 120, Indiana Jones 3 Holy Grail Scene, YOUTUBE 
(May 20, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A0TalLrtZ24 [http://perma.cc 
/J33W-FSVC] (displaying video-clip from INDIANA JONES AND THE LAST CRUSADE 
(Paramount Pictures 1989)). 
2 See Creagan Dow, Horror Movie: It’s What You Do—GEICO Commercial, 
YOUTUBE (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uQ-hlcux66s [http:// 
perma.cc/4G96-SUXV] (depicting horror movie characters choosing poorly). 
3 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 74 (1st ed. 2008). 
4 See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3. 
5 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 109–265 (1st ed. 2011) 
(surveying this research). 
6 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 4 (introducing nudges); Pierre 
Schlag, Nudge, Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 913, 913 (2010) (reviewing and critiquing the book NUDGE). 
7 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 3; Schlag, supra note 6, at 916. 
8 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 30. 
9 Id. at 26. 
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in memory of Alfred Nobel to behavioral economist Richard Thaler 
has focused more public attention on, and popular press coverage 
of, nudges.10 
This Article analyzes and advocates boosts that aim to en-
hance people’s decision-making competencies,11 such as risk or 
statistical literacy education,12 identifying and teaching people a 
limited core of domain-specific factual and procedural knowledge,13 
and designing and disseminating simple cognitive heuristic strate-
gies that support better decision-making.14 This Article advocates 
policies to foster people adopting growth mindsets,15 as opposed 
to fixed mindsets, about their decision-making skills to create a 
learning society16 and a learning economy,17 which are both in-
herently linked to democracy.18 Being optimistic about one’s ability 
to change and learn facilitates learning.19 Conversely, being pessi-
mistic about one’s ability to change and learn impedes learning.20 
                                                                                                            
10 Richard H. Thaler, Award Recipient, Prize Lecture: From Cashews 
to Nudges: The Evolution of Behavioral Economics at Stockholm University 
(Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences 
/laureates/2017/thaler-lecture.html [http://perma.cc/AN5D-K2ZW]. 
11 Till Grüne-Yanoff & Ralph Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost: How Coherent 
are Policy and Theory? 26 MINDS & MACHINES 149, 156 (2016) [hereinafter 
Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost]; Ralph Hertwig, When to Consider 
Boosting: Some Rules for Policy-Makers, 1 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 143, 144, 146 
(2017); Ralph Hertwig & Till Grüne-Yanoff, Nudging and Boosting: Steering 
or Empowering Good Decisions, 12 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 973, 974 (2017) 
[hereinafter Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, Nudging and Boosting]. 
12 Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost, supra note 11, at 158–59, 166; 
Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, Nudging and Boosting, supra note 11, at 977, 979. 
13 Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost, supra note 11, at 159–60. 
14 Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost, supra note 11, at 162; 
Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, Nudging and Boosting, supra note 11, at 979. 
15 CAROL DWECK, MINDSET: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS ix (1st ed. 
2007). 
16 See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & BRUCE C. GREENWALD, CREATING A 
LEARNING SOCIETY: A NEW APPROACH TO GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL 
PROGRESS 457–72 (2014) (explaining that learning is a way to change mind-
sets which leads to a society’s growth and development). 
17 See generally id. at 47–87 (exploring how to create an economy that 
supports learning). 
18 Id. at 466. 
19 RICHARD E. NISBETT, INTELLIGENCE AND HOW TO GET IT: WHY SCHOOLS 
AND CULTURES COUNT 143 (2d ed. 2010). 
20 Miles Kimball, There’s one key difference between kids who excel at math 
and those who don’t, QUARTZ (Oct. 27, 2013), http://qz.com/139453/theres-one 
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One reason that people choose poorly is a lack of thinking care-
fully and clearly, which in turn makes people vulnerable to im-
pulsiveness, short-sightedness, neglect of probabilities, and many 
other cognitive biases.21 This Article advocates a human devel-
opmental approach to law and economics that draws upon bio-
logical, cognitive, neurological, psychological, and social theories 
of human development.22 Humans can develop abilities, compe-
tencies, and virtues23 to realize their full potentials.24 
There are many reasons why American society should boost 
people’s decision-making competencies.25 First, an effective and 
well-functioning democracy requires educating individuals about 
how to make good civic and governance decisions.26 Second, edu-
cating people to make better economic and political decisions 
reduces economic inequalities and political inequities.27 Third, when 
choosing poorly leads to individually undesirable outcomes, there 
are negative consequences for those people and their families and 
even for societies if societal resources must be allocated to deal 
with the individually undesirable outcomes of those choices.28 Such 
negative externalities provide a well-known justification for gov-
ernment intervention.29 Fourth, effective decision-making skills 
are public goods with positive externalities (such as better citizen-
ship, voting, marriages, parenting, physical health, mental health, 
                                                                                                            
-key-difference-between-kids-who-excel-at-math-and-those-who-dont/ [http:// 
perma.cc/B7Q7-SUXD]. 
21 Jonathan Baron & Rex V. Brown, Why Americans Can’t Think Straight, 
in TEACHING DECISION-MAKING TO ADOLESCENTS 1, 2–3 (Jonathan Baron & 
Rex V. Brown eds., 1st ed. 1991). 
22 John F. Tomer, Smart Persons and Human Development: The Missing 
Ingredient in Behavioral Economics, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS 
AND SMART DECISION-MAKING: RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING WITHIN THE BOUNDS 
OF REASON 137, 138 (Morris Altman ed., 1st ed. 2017). 
23 Id. at 149–51. 
24 Id. at 152. 
25 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3. 
26 See Martha Minow, Education and Democracy, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 17, 
2017), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/education-and-democracy/ [http://perma 
.cc/NN8K-AQCF]. 
27 See id. 
28 See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Eco-
nomics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 
1212 (2003). 
29 Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost, supra note 11, at 149. 
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and well-being) and correspondingly ineffective decision-making 
skills are public bads with negative externalities (for example, when 
governments have to use tax dollars to deal with the individual and 
societal consequences of ineffective individual decision-making).30 
Fifth, the private sector may not have enough incentive to improve 
people’s decision-making skills because often businesses can profit 
more from exploiting people’s cognitive biases31 than mitigating 
them, and/or businesses cannot capture all of the benefits from 
improving people’s decision-making competencies because some 
of those benefits are uncertain, delayed, and spillover into many 
other wide-ranging domains.32 Sixth, even if businesses can profit 
from improving people’s decision-making competencies, there are 
issues of access, affordability, equity, and fairness about whether 
empowering people to make better decisions should be left to just 
(not necessarily competitive) market forces.33 Seventh, public and 
private boosts can coexist as they do with many other subjects.34 
Eighth, because people will form decision-making habits and main-
tain decision-making routines, boosts can and should begin as 
early as possible with children.35 
The difference between a nudge and a boost is concretely 
illustrated in the context of eating.36 In his 2017 economics Nobel 
Prize lecture,37 Thaler tells the well-known story about how eve-
rybody thanked him when he was a graduate student at a party 
when he took a bowl of cashews into the kitchen after about half 
the nuts had been eaten.38 His moving the nuts is an example of 
                                                                                                            
30 See JESSICA LAHEY, THE GIFT OF FAILURE: HOW THE BEST PARENTS 
LEARN TO LET GO SO THEIR CHILDREN CAN SUCCEED xxvii (1st ed. 2015); THALER 
& SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 74; Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost, 
supra note 11, at 149, 175; Minow, supra note 26. 
31 GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE ECO-
NOMICS OF MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION 1–2 (1st ed. 2015). 
32 See generally id. (explaining how competition leads to the benefits of 
consumer decisions being spread out throughout the free market). 
33 See generally id. (explaining how the free market can both help and hurt 
consumers, but how consumer impact will reach equilibrium naturally through 
the market). 
34 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 71. 
35 See Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, Nudging and Boosting, supra note 11, at 
978–79. 
36 Thaler, supra note 10. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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a nudge because it changed people’s choice environment in a way 
that was easy for people to reverse.39 
Those nuts were now in the kitchen.40 People could still eat 
them if they just went to the kitchen.41 The reason Thaler moved 
them is because he correctly believed most people would not walk 
to the kitchen to eat the nuts.42 When the nuts were in front of 
people, many people ate those nuts mindlessly.43 
A boost alternative to mindless eating is to teach people to 
manage their lifestyle differently, make changes in food choices, 
increase aerobic activity, and reduce stress through mindfulness 
meditation, yoga, guided imagery, breathing, and relaxation ex-
ercises.44 This boost changes people’s decision-making compe-
tencies.45 It also has benefits that spill over into other domains 
besides eating.46 This boost can help people to focus on what is 
important, develop self-belief, self-efficacy, self-confidence, and 
self-compassion.47 The nudge of removing tempting food is a 
short-term intervention that changes people’s decision-making 
environment.48 The mindful eating boost is a long-term inter-
vention that changes people’s decision-making competencies.49 
The mindful eating boost has higher costs (in terms of effort, time, 
and money) and higher benefits (in terms of spillovers, self-con-
fidence, and self-efficacy) than the moving tempting food nudge.50 
The costs and benefits of boosts and nudges can vary across people 
                                                                                                            
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Learn to be Lean Program, MASS. GEN. HOSP. CORRIGAN MINEHAN HEART 
CTR., http://www.massgeneral.org/heartcenter/cardiac_metabolicsyndrome_pro 
gram.aspx?display=learn-to-be-lean [http://perma.cc/6T44-2NU9]. 
45 See id. 
46 Terry Byrne, Prevention Priority: Emphasis on Wellness Grows, MASS. GEN. 
HOSP. MAG., https://giving.massgeneral.org/disease-prevention-as-priority/ [http:// 
perma.cc/8T9D-VJ35]. 
47 Id. (reporting that participants learn to eat mindfully, focus on “making 
healthy lifestyle choices” and “shift their mindset toward healthy behavior 
over the long term. It’s ... an approach to healthy eating.”). 
48 See Thaler, supra note 10. 
49 Hertwig, supra note 11, at 155. 
50 See id. at 157; Byrne, supra note 46. 
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and time. Nudges and boosts are not mutually exclusive.51 Nudges 
and boosts can be complements or substitutes.52 Boosts respect 
and foster people’s abilities to develop and learn decision-making 
competencies.53 Nudges assume that people’s abilities to develop 
and learn decision-making competencies are lacking or not 
worth engaging.54 
This Article advocates that societies can and should prom-
ulgate boosts. This Article focuses on these boosts: (1) practicing 
mindfulness and (2) thinking boosts, including thinking technol-
ogies and diversity. There are three audiences to which this Ar-
ticle is addressed. First, this Article offers a guide to law students, 
law professors, lawyers, judges, regulators, and indeed anyone 
interested in how to improve their decision-making competen-
cies in order to make better decisions. Second, this Article is 
directed at federal and state policymakers to engage with and 
complement an existing literature about nudging. Third, this 
Article is aimed at policymakers and the public in advocating that 
societies empower people through boosts that improve decision-
making competencies. 
The rest of this Article is organized as follows. Part I ana-
lyzes how to improve decision-making. Part II analyzes how 
mindfulness can improve people’s processes of making decisions in 
any situation by more consciously, deliberatively, and thoughtfully 
responding instead of automatically, reflexively, and unconsciously 
reacting. Part II extends a recent novel application of real-options 
theory55 analyzing how improving mindfulness fosters legal eth-
ics and professionalism.56 Part II also analyzes other ways in 
which mindfulness can improve people’s decision-making. Part 
III analyzes two kinds of thinking boosts: thinking technologies 
that build on behavioral research about how people think and 
                                                                                                            
51 See Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, Nudging and Boosting, supra note 11, at 979. 
52 Id. 
53 Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost, supra note 11, at 156. 
54 Id. at 153. 
55 Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney’s 
Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1943, 1946–47 (1998) 
(discussing examples of real options). 
56 Peter H. Huang, How Improving Decision-Making and Mindfulness Can Im-
prove Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 21 J.L. BUS. & ETHICS 35, 68–71 (2015). 
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behave on digital screens,57 and diversity that builds on complex 
systems research about how groups make decisions.58 
I. HOW TO IMPROVE DECISION-MAKING 
The quality of people’s choices can be assessed according 
to multiple criteria.59 Two established criteria are60: (1) whether 
people’s decisions are coherent with normative standards of in-
ternal consistency, such as transitivity of preferences or Bayes’ 
theorem, and (2) whether people’s decisions correspond with reality. 
A third criterion asks if people’s decisions attain their goals.61 A 
final possible criterion asks if people’s choices are socially desir-
able.62 This Article focuses on the personal goal attainment and 
social desirability criteria of assessing people’s choices. 
Utilizing the criteria of subjective goal attainment and so-
cial desirability, choosing poorly is costly.63 Increases in information 
(and noise), time pressure constraints, simultaneous decision-
making, globalization, and information-based economies all imply 
that choosing poorly will become costlier for “individuals, fami-
lies, businesses, governments, and societies. ... After all, errors 
induced by biases in judgment lead decision makers to undersave 
for retirement, engage in needless conflict, marry the wrong part-
ners, accept the wrong jobs, and wrongly invade countries.”64 In 
                                                                                                            
57 See, e.g., SHLOMO BENARTZI WITH JONAH LEHRER, THE SMARTER SCREEN: 
SURPRISING WAYS TO INFLUENCE AND IMPROVE ONLINE BEHAVIOR (1st ed. 2015). 
58 See, e.g., SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF 
DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 24–25, 
50 (rev. ed. 2008). 
59 See Philip T. Dunwoody, Theories of Truth as Assessment Criteria in Judg-
ment and Decision-making, 4 JUDGMENT & DECISION-MAKING 116, 123 (2009); 
Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost, supra note 11, at 162. See gener-
ally KENNETH R. HAMMOND, HUMAN JUDGMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY: IRREDUCIBLE 
UNCERTAINTY, INEVITABLE ERROR, UNAVOIDABLE INJUSTICE 95–106 (2000) (defin-
ing and providing examples of the criteria of coherence and correspondence). 
60 See HAMMOND, supra note 59, at 95–106 (defining and providing exam-
ples of the criteria of coherence and correspondence). 
61 Dunwoody, supra note 59, at 123. 
62 Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost, supra note 11, at 162. 
63 See Dunwoody, supra note 59, at 123; Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, Nudge 
Versus Boost, supra note 11, at 162. 
64 Katherine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision-making Be Improved?, 4 
PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 379, 379 (2009). 
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addition to monetary costs of choosing poorly, there are psychologi-
cal and emotional costs to choosing poorly.65 
Given that people often consider themselves as choosing 
suboptimally, societies face a fundamental question: how can and 
should societies respond to people’s choosing suboptimally? The 
answer depends on to what extent “self-reflection, experience, 
learning, feedback, routines, assistance, supervision, oversight, and 
a full array of punishment and rewards” can overcome the pres-
ence and extent of cognitive errors.66 Making decisions can be 
difficult and stressful, even with help from others.67 There is a 
decision-making information marketplace consisting of advice, 
books, courses, online services, planning, and software among 
other products.68 Law can and should help decision makers who 
are not experts, which is all of us in some area(s) or domain(s).69 
The question is how to do this. This Article analyzes three poli-
cies. The first is a laissez-faire policy of doing nothing based on a 
belief that people can learn from their experience to improve 
decision-making.70 The second is the by now well-known interven-
tion of nudges designed to improve the outcomes of people’s deci-
sion-making by changing their decision-making environments.71 
The third is the more recent innovation of boosts that aim to 
improve people’s decision-making competencies.72 
A. Problems with Improving Decision-Making from Experience 
A possible response to people making suboptimal choices is 
for governments to do nothing based upon a belief that over time 
and with repeated experience people will improve their decision-
making.73 One problem with this reaction is that many decisions 
(such as marriage and retirement) are infrequent, entail large 
                                                                                                            
65 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 33–34. 
66 Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market 
Corrections, 73 J. U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 111 (2006). 
67 See id. 
68 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 255–62 (giving examples of a 
variety of sources to further understand decision-making). 
69 See id. at 3. 
70 Id. at 83. 
71 Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, Nudging and Boosting, supra note 11, at 973. 
72 Id. at 974. 
73 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 6. 
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personal and social costs if incorrectly decided, and provide de-
layed, limited, and noisy feedback.74 An analogous philosophy in 
the realm of parenting, called autonomy-supportive parenting,75 
advocates parents let their kids fail so their kids can learn from 
such experiences.76 
One reason that philosopher Mark White is critical of nudges 
is that nudging shields people from opportunities to make mis-
takes, learn from them, and in so doing, develop such character 
virtues as temperance and tenacity.77 Legal scholars Jonathan 
Klick and Gregory Mitchell analyze how paternalistic interven-
tions may create cognitive hazards, which “interfere with infor-
mation searches, educational investments, and feedback that 
would occur in the absence of paternalistic interventions and that 
are important to the individual’s development of effective decision-
making skills and strategies.”78 They are concerned that pater-
nalistic policies may restrict learning opportunities and introduce 
noise into, or mute feedback signals in, learning environments.79 
They are also concerned that paternalistic policies can become self-
fulfilling for both laypeople and regulators, leading to further 
demand for additional future paternalism.80 They base their analy-
sis upon developmental psychological research indicating “that 
individuals improve their decision-making skills over time through 
a ‘learning by doing’ process”81 and psychologist James Byrnes’ 
self-regulation model of decision-making.82 Klick and Mitchell 
are justified to be concerned that paternalistic interventions and 
                                                                                                            
74 Id. at 73–76. 
75 LAHEY, supra note 30, at xxi–xxii; Greg Toppo with Jessica Lahey, New 
Book Suggests Parents Learn to Let Kids Fail, USA TODAY (Aug. 12, 2015), 
http://usat.ly/1Tsg9wn [http://perma.cc/9N89-FE8U]. 
76 See MARK D. WHITE, THE MANIPULATION OF CHOICE: ETHICS AND LIBER-
TARIAN PATERNALISM 119–23 (2013). 
77 See id. at 119. 
78 Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irration-
ality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1626 (2006). 
79 See id. at 1633. 
80 See id. at 1638–41; WHITE, supra note 76, at 122. 
81 Klick & Mitchell, supra note 78, at 1626. 
82 See JAMES P. BYRNES, THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF DECISION-
MAKING: A SELF-REGULATION MODEL 109–10 (1998); James P. Byrnes et al., 
Learning to Make Good Decisions: A Self-Regulation Perspective, 70 CHILD 
DEV. 1121, 1124 (1999). 
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nudges may hinder people from having opportunities to learn from 
experience about how to make better decisions.83 In fact, even in 
the absence of paternalistic interventions, learning how to make 
better decisions is difficult.84 
More recently, Byrnes examines motivational reasons for 
why people do not apply the effort and time required to engage 
in critical-analytic thinking.85 
Although the idea that people can and should learn from 
their experiences of choosing poorly is intuitively plausible and 
seems quite reasonable, there are many difficulties with people 
learning from their experiences of choosing poorly.86 Some of 
these difficulties are intrinsic to experience and some are intrin-
sic to people.87 Learning from experiences is difficult for humans 
in part because of the cognitive biases and heuristics that are part 
of human behavior.88 Learning from experiences is also difficult 
because of several intrinsic aspects of the nature of experiences, 
including: complexity of causality in experience, endogenous 
nature of experience, multiplicity of interpretations about expe-
rience, and noisiness of experience.89 Decision-making research-
er James March concluded that the bottom line about learning 
from experience is: “[e]xperience may possibly be the best teacher, 
but it is not a particularly good teacher.”90 Because most of what 
people learn is from other people, the issue of how to determine 
whom to trust is also critical to effective learning.91 In addition 
to difficulties in learning from direct experiences, there are many 
other difficulties in learning from others’ experiences.92 
                                                                                                            
83 See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 78, at 1625–26. 
84 Id. at 1626. 
85 See James P. Byrnes & Kevin N. Dunbar, The Nature and Development 
of Critical-Analytical Thinking, 26 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 477, 477 (2014). 
86 See id. at 489. 
87 See id. at 483, 486. 
88 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 5, at 109–265 (surveying this research). 
89 See JAMES MARCH, THE AMBIGUITIES OF EXPERIENCE 100–01 (2010) (ex-
amining problems inherent with the process of learning from experience). 
90 Id. at 115. 
91 See PAUL L. HARRIS, TRUSTING WHAT YOU’RE TOLD: HOW CHILDREN LEARN 
FROM OTHERS 60 (2012) (examining the importance of how children and also 
adults learn primarily from others instead of first-hand experience). 
92 See Jerker Denrell, Vicarious Learning, Undersampling of Failure, and 
the Myths of Management, 14 ORG. SCI. 227, 227 (2003). 
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We learn indirectly from memories of experiences as op-
posed to directly from ephemeral experiences.93 Experiences are 
fleeting and momentary by their very nature.94 Learning from 
experience is problematic due to the incomplete and selective nature 
of people’s memories of their experiences.95 Psychological research 
has found that ex post memories coincide with ex ante predictions 
instead of interim experiences.96 The convergence between memo-
ries and expectations means that instead of learning from expe-
rience, people learn from selectively reconstructed memories of 
experiences.97 People often make similar mistakes repeatedly 
due to imperfect learning and not seeing reality clearly for what 
it is.98 As musician and pop star Taylor Swift states,99 “But you’ll 
come back each time you leave, [c]ause darling I’m a nightmare 
dressed like a daydream.” 
Even if people manage to learn from experience, there is the 
question of whether people can transfer whatever is learned across 
domains.100 Empirical research has also found that many people, 
including MBA students, have difficulties with transferring lessons 
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that they have learned in one context to analogous yet novel 
contexts.101 Some law students have similar difficulties with 
reasoning by analogy to case precedents in the common law.102 
The above discussion presents the case that people will 
have difficulties with improving their decision-making utilizing 
a particular form of learning, namely learning from experiences 
of choosing poorly.103 This Article therefore advocates other 
forms of learning to improve people’s decision-making, namely 
learning about mindfulness, thinking architecture, and thinking 
technologies.104 
B. Nudging or Steering People’s Decision Outcomes 
A nudge is “any aspect of the choice architecture that al-
ters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding 
any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”105 
As this definition makes clear, the target of nudges is behavior.106 
More recently, Sunstein distinguishes between educative and 
non-educative nudges based on whether a nudge provides infor-
mation.107 The most famous examples of non-educative nudges 
are defaults.108 
Examples of educative nudges include disclosure require-
ments, nutrition labels, warning labels, and reminders.109 Both 
educative and non-educative nudges steer people’s behavior by 
utilizing cognitive biases or taking advantage of motivational 
deficiencies.110 Even though an educative nudge is educative in 
the sense of providing information, an educative nudge does not 
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educate in the sense of improving people’s cognitive or motiva-
tional competencies.111 
The philosophy underlying nudging is “that the same fac-
tors that lead us to make a mindless suboptimal or unhealthy choice 
can often be reversed to help us make a mindless better choice.”112 
Marketing professor Brian Wansink and his co-authors have 
demonstrated in many studies that people often eat more than 
they think because they eat mindlessly.113 An obvious response 
to mindless eating is to practice mindful eating.114 Wansink be-
lieves that “[f]or 90 [percent] of us, the solution to mindless eat-
ing is not mindful eating—our lives are just too crazy and our 
willpower’s too wimpy.”115 Instead, Wansink advocates nudges 
or self-nudges to modify food environments.116 
Wansink’s ideas are related to psychology professor Angela 
Duckworth’s proposal that people proactively choose or change 
the situations they will face to reduce the power of undesirable 
impulses or increase the power of more desirable impulses.117 
For such matter over mind strategies to succeed, people must be 
mindful at the earlier point in time when they choose or modify 
the matter of their situations, so that they can be mindless later 
and rely on their established habitual ways of behaving.118 As 
Gretchen Rubin observes, “[h]abits are freeing and energizing 
because they eliminate decision and self-control.”119 
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Recently, there has been a backlash against nudges.120 Pro-
fessor Lauren Willis provides evidence that outside the automatic 
enrollment retirement context, defaults may fail to stick and 
those opting out of defaults would have benefited the most from 
the defaults.121 Nudges defaulting employees into retirement plans 
have been demonstrated to lead to regret,122 “may encourage 
irresponsible spending or early withdrawals of retirement money 
(with penalties) to cover debts,”123 and can lead to learning less 
about financial matters and sharing less financial information 
with friends and families.124 Experimental research finds that 
email reminders to donate to charities can backfire by annoying 
recipients to unsubscribe from such email lists.125 
An explicit or implicit assumption of choice architecture 
and information architecture is that people have fixed skills in 
making choices or educating people to improve their decision-
making is futile or too costly to be worthwhile.126 Choice archi-
tecture and information architecture are often contrasted with 
                                                                                                            
/?utm_source=kw_newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2015-07 
-22; see also CHARLES DUHIGG, THE POWER OF HABIT: WHY WE DO WHAT WE 
DO IN LIFE AND BUSINESS 20 (2012); GRETCHEN RUBIN, BETTER THAN BEFORE: 
MASTERING THE HABITS OF OUR EVERYDAY LIVES 4–5 (2015). 
120 See Bruce Bower, Nudge Backlash, 191 SCI. NEWS 18, 19 (2017) (dis-
cussing some downsides of nudging). 
121 See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1155, 1155 (2013). 
122 See id. at 19–20; Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Decision-Making Approaches 
and the Propensity to Default: Evidence and Implications, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 
477, 489 (2016) (finding employees nudged into default retirement plans had 
the most regret over their past pension choices). 
123 Bower, supra note 120, at 20. 
124 See id. at 20–21; Bruce Ian Carlin et al., Libertarian Paternalism, In-
formation Production, and Financial Decision-making, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 
2204, 2220–21 (2013) (proving in an economic model that those nudged into 
retirement defaults may acquire less financial information and share less financial 
information with their friends and families). 
125 See Bower, supra note 120, at 19, 22; see also Mette Trier Damgaard & 
Christina Gravert, The Hidden Cost of Nudging: Experimental Evidence on 
Reminders and Unsubscriptions, 157 J. PUB. ECON. 15, 15–16 (2018) (docu-
menting in two field experiments the hidden costs of charitable donation email 
reminder nudges in terms of annoyance and unsubscribing). 
126 See Shlomo Benartzi et al., Should Government Invest More in Nudg-
ing?, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1051, 1057 (2017). 
156 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:139 
and touted as being cheaper than and requiring less effort of 
laypeople and policymakers than educating people or traditional 
economic policies.127 For example, psychologists Elke Weber and 
Eric Johnson state: “standard economic analysis suggests rather 
expensive government interventions (such as tax incentives) or 
effortful (for both provider and recipient) public education.”128 
Although choice architecture and information architecture are 
low-cost or low-effort interventions,129 they also are low-benefit 
or low-reward interventions in the sense of not producing learn-
ing benefits and rewards that can potentially spill over to many 
other choice situations.130 
In a helpful user’s guide to debiasing,131 professors Jack 
B. Soll, Katherine L. Milkman, and John W. Payne divide paths 
to improving decisions into two general categories: “(1) modifying 
the person through either education or the provision of strategies 
and tools, and (2) modifying the environment a decision maker 
faces to facilitate wiser choices.”132 The first approach equips 
“people with some combination of knowledge and tools to help them 
overcome their limitations and dispositions ... [this approach] draws 
upon classic debiasing research on the benefits of education as 
well as thinking strategies, rules of thumb, and more formal 
decision aids that people can be taught to use.”133 Educating 
people about practicing mindfulness and utilizing thinking tools 
illustrates the first approach.134 
The second approach changes the choice setting “in a way 
that either encourages better strategies or is a better match for the 
decision strategies that people naturally apply. This approach 
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accepts there is a bias and strives to create situations in which 
that bias is irrelevant or more commonly useful.”135 Professor 
Shlomo Benartzi recently proposed the idea of “digital nudging, 
which seeks to identify online designs that help people make 
smarter choices.”136 
Choice architecture and information architecture exemplify 
the second approach and often harness or take advantage of a 
cognitive bias to mitigate another cognitive bias.137 
Modifying decision makers involves more optimism about 
people’s abilities and motivations to learn decision-making skills 
than modifying decision environments.138 Finally, some inter-
ventions are classifiable as modifying decision makers and/or 
modifying decision environments.139 For example, Soll, Milkman, 
and Payne describe checklists as examples of both modifying 
decision makers and modifying decision environments through 
nudges to induce reflection.140 
C. Boosting People’s Decision-Making Competencies 
Boosts can enhance, establish, or foster many competen-
cies.141 Risk literacy boosts improve understanding statistical 
information in such areas as climate, health, personal finance, 
politics, and safety. Examples of risk literacy boosts are: (1) 
training of math skills in general, such as math story time with 
parents,142 (2) brief training in converting opaque risk represen-
tations, such as single-event probabilities, into transparent risk 
representations, such as frequency-based representations,143 (3) 
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graphical risk representations,144 (4) experienced-based instead 
of purely description-based representations of risk,145 and (5) repre-
sentations of risk, such as absolute instead of relative frequencies, 
that avoid biasing framing effects.146 Uncertainty management 
boosts are procedural rules to make assessments, decisions, and 
predictions in the face of uncertainty when risk information is 
not available.147 Examples of uncertainty management boosts are: 
(1) fast and frugal decision trees, procedural routines, and sim-
ple heuristics,148 (2) simple actuarial inference methods,149 and 
(3) simple rules of collective intelligence.150 Motivational boosts 
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enhance the competence of autonomously adjusting cognitive 
control, motivation, and self-control.151 Examples of motivational 
boosts are: (1) attention training and attention state training,152 
(2) psychological connectedness training,153 (3) expressive writ-
ing,154 (4) growth mindset or sense-of-purpose exercises,155 (5) 
reward-bundling exercises,156 (6) training in pre-commitment 
strategies,157 (7) training in self-control strategies,158 and (8) har-
nessing simple implementation intentions.159 
Boosts are related to the simple heuristics (SH) research pro-
gram,160 which “has aimed to explore the cognitive mechanisms 
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that a boundedly rational decision maker—one operating under 
conditions of limited computational capacity, limited information, 
and uncertainty—employs to make satisficing, that is, good enough 
decisions.”161 The SH program is grounded in ecological rational-
ity theory,162 which posits “that simple heuristics are adaptive 
and that heuristics cause problems mainly when underlying cogni-
tive strategies are mismatched to situations. Consequently, peo-
ple need to learn to calibrate their strategies to the environment 
to avoid bad decisions.”163 
The SH research program differs from the well-known heu-
ristics and biases (H&B) research program, whose researchers have 
“catalogued a long list of what are widely considered systematic 
cognitive biases and flawed (e.g., temporally inconsistent) moti-
vations which, they argue, lead to poor choices.”164 Psychologist 
Gary Klein, cogently stated about the H&B paradigm that it: 
has done a valuable service by identifying some important 
heuristics that people employ for thinking about complex is-
sues. The classical paradigm—the demonstration that people 
use heuristics even if they result in errors—is useful and often 
intuitive. Unfortunately, the paradigm is often misinterpreted 
as implying that heuristics are always biasing and that every-
day thinking is irrational. These extensions are unwarranted, 
misleading, and counter-productive. They reflect a sort of hyper-
rationality bias.165 
While the SH research program “does not deny that peo-
ple sometimes make poor decisions.166 Unlike the H&B program, 
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however, it does not attribute these behaviors to profoundly flawed 
mental software.167 Instead, it presents a vision of bounded ra-
tionality according to which human reasoning and decision-making 
can be modeled in terms of SH ....”168 In particular, the SH research 
program acknowledges that “choices detrimental to individual and 
collective welfare can arise for various reasons, including the use 
of heuristics in environments that have changed—as a result of 
which the cognitive strategy no longer interlocks properly with 
the environmental structures ...—or the provision of information 
that is ... profoundly confusing.”169 
Under the H&B research program, “the goal is to design poli-
cies, that by co-opting systematic biases, nudge individual behavior 
toward a different, more beneficial outcome.”170 In contrast, un-
der the SH research program, “policies should aim to extend the 
decision-making competencies of laypeople and professionals 
alike.171 To this end, interventions can target the individual’s skills 
and knowledge, the available set of decision tools, or the environ-
ment in which decisions are made.”172 Nudging assumes that “peo-
ple tend to be somewhat mindless, passive decision makers.”173 In 
contrast, boosting “assumes a decision maker whose competen-
cies can be improved by enriching his or her repertoire of skills 
and decision tools and/or by restructuring the environment such 
that existing skills and tools can be more effectively applied.”174 
Therefore although many boosts aim to modify decision mak-
ers,175 some boosts aim to modify decision environments.176 
The SH research program does “not deny that people are 
not perfect thinkers and, at times, make bad decisions (for a 
variety of reasons).177 However, the difference to the H&B program 
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is that these difficulties are not assumed to be so impervious to 
change that they have to be exploited rather than overcome.”178 
The approach of boosting assumes that “these difficulties can be 
addressed by training, information, education, better decision 
strategies, and better representations. The nudge approach, in 
contrast, presupposes that these cognitive deficiencies are diffi-
cult or costly to overcome, and therefore recommends their skill-
ful manipulation to facilitate better choices”179 or more precisely 
better outcomes being nudged on existing imperfect decision-
making processes rather than improving decision-making pro-
cesses themselves. Boosts and nudges can sometimes overlap in 
their policy recommendations, such as in the case of judiciously 
setting defaults.180 Even when boosts and nudges overlap, the 
causal mechanisms underlying the rationales for those policies dif-
fer.181 In the case of defaults, proponents of nudges explain how 
effective defaults are by “inertia, status-quo bias, or the ‘yeah, 
whatever heuristic’”182 and in so doing are “revealing the policy 
to be rebiasing.”183 On the other hand, proponents of boosts ex-
plain how effective defaults are by “the implicit recommendation 
or endorsement effect ... describing the behavioral change in re-
sponse to the default as consisting in a learning effect, and hence 
revealing the policy to be debiasing.”184 
More generally, boosts and nudges differ in their underlying 
assumptions about what cognitive errors they intend to counter-
act, their policy goals, characteristics of people they intend to help, 
and characteristics of policymakers.185 Nudging does not assume 
that people have awareness or controllability of cognitive errors, 
while boosting assumes that people can detect and mitigate cog-
nitive errors.186 Nudging assumes that policymakers have infor-
mation about people’s goals or the distribution of people’s goals 
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in the presence of goal heterogeneity, while boosting does not re-
quire such strong informational assumptions.187 Nudging assumes 
that policymakers are less cognitively error prone than laypeople 
and are benevolent, while boosting does not make such assump-
tions about policymakers’ cognition or motivation.188 Finally, boost-
ing assumes that people are able to acquire trained skills and 
motivated to utilize trained skills, while nudging does not make 
such assumptions about people’s abilities and motivations.189 
Philosopher Till Grüne-Yanoff and psychologist Ralph 
Hertwig compare to what degree the H&B and SH research pro-
grams about bounded rationality support the above necessary un-
derlying policy assumptions of nudges and boosts respectively.190 
Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig conclude that while the H&B re-
search program does not imply all of the policy assumptions 
underlying nudging and the SH research program does not im-
ply all of the policy assumptions underlying boosting, there is a 
greater partial disconnect between nudging and the H&B research 
program compared to boosting and the SH research program.191 
They also conclude that “criticism that nudge[s] policies infringe 
on human autonomy and dignity do not apply (or applies less) to 
boost policies.”192 
Nudges and boosts differ in their assumptions about peo-
ple’s cognitive architecture, which is the infrastructure of how 
people process information.193 Cognitive architecture includes such 
mental hardware as memory structures for storing knowledge, 
beliefs, and goals.194 Cognitive architecture also includes such 
functional processes that operate on mental hardware as cogni-
tive algorithms, reasoning processes, and heuristics.195 Nudges 
assume that people have a dual system cognitive architecture of 
system 1 versus 2,196 while boosts do not assume that people 
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have a particular cognitive architecture.197 Boosts assume that 
whatever people’s cognitive architecture is, that cognitive archi-
tecture is “malleable and worth developing.”198 In particular, boosts 
assume people’s current mental tools can be enhanced or that peo-
ple can learn to utilize new procedural rules.199 Boosts focus on 
fostering people’s competencies, including redesigning people’s 
external environments or teaching people how to redesign their 
external environments.200 
An empirical and pragmatic difference between boosts and 
nudges is their permanence or reversibility.201 Because boosts aim 
to enhance people’s existing cognitive and motivational competen-
cies or establish new cognitive and motivational competencies, 
those competencies should persist, meaning their consequences 
on behavior should also be stable and permanent over time after 
the boost stops.202 Because nudges change the choice architecture 
and do not alter people’s existing cognitive and motivational com-
petencies, those competencies do not improve, meaning that be-
havior will revert back if a nudge is eliminated.203 A nudge can 
transform into a boost if that nudge unintentionally improves cog-
nitive and motivational competencies.204 
Hertwig proposes these six rules to help guide policymak-
ers in determining to employ boosts or nudges.205 First, when 
people do not have the cognitive capacities or motivation to de-
velop new competencies or skills, nudge instead of boost.206 Sec-
ond, when policymakers are unsure about people’s goals, when 
there is a lot of diversity over society in goals, or when a person 
has conflicting goals, boosts are less prone to errors than nudges.207 
Third, when nudging requires nontransparency or invisibility to 
those who are nudged, nudging is paternalistic because it fails 
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the easy reversibility criterion.208 Fourth, when governments are 
not always benevolent, or when governments allow private actors 
to create toxic choice architectures, boosts protect people better 
than nudges.209 Fifth, when policymakers endeavor to foster per-
manent behavioral changes and generalizable across many choice 
architectures, boost instead of nudge.210 Sixth, when there are 
significant risks of unanticipated or unpredictable consequences of a 
boost or nudge, consider its respective alternative.211 
To Hertwig’s helpful rules, this Article adds these addi-
tional rules. Seventh, when people face the same or similar deci-
sions in one context repeatedly, boost instead of nudge because 
an effective boost is one-time as opposed to nudges that have to 
be repeated.212 Eighth, when people face similar decisions across 
different settings, boost instead of nudge because an effective 
boost is a one-time intervention as opposed to having to make 
multiple nudges across settings.213 Ninth, when people face deci-
sions that are likely to change over time, boost instead of nudge 
because an effective one-time boost will enable people to adapt 
internally to changes as opposed to nudges that have to be changed 
externally over time.214 Tenth, when people face decisions that 
are personal or private, boost instead of nudge because a boost is 
more likely to lead to reflection and introspection.215 Eleventh, 
when people face decisions that are irreversible or costly to reverse, 
boost instead of nudge because a boost is more likely to engage 
in people taking care and paying attention. Twelfth, utilize a boost 
when that boost involves play and fun because that boost is likely 
to become self-motivating and self-sustaining through adrenaline, 
dopamine, engagement, excitement, harnessing competitive in-
stincts, positive emotions, and stimulating brain reward centers.216 
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This Article advocates boosting people’s decision-making 
competencies by practicing mindfulness and utilizing thinking 
tools. Mindfulness and thinking tools are boosts in the sense of 
“empowering people by expanding (boosting) their competencies 
and thus helping them to reach their objectives (without making 
undue assumptions about what those objectives are).”217 All the 
boosts that this Article advocates aim to transform people into 
better decision makers by expanding their portfolios of decision-
making abilities, decision-making information, and decision-making 
tools.218 While Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig advocate teaching 
financial literacy,219 in light of the empirical research demonstrat-
ing that “[f]inancial education as studied to date has serious limita-
tions that have been masked by the apparently larger effects in 
correlational studies,”220 this Article advocates novel ways of 
motivating people to acquire and utilize financial skills, such as 
utilizing financial entertainment computer video games to help 
people learn basic financial skills221 and utilizing serious games to 
help people learn about cognitive biases and improve their decision-
making.222 The play aspect of both of these types of games may 
also make it more likely that people are both able to acquire trained 
skills and motivated to utilize trained skills.223 Finally, there is al-
ready much empirical and experimental experience demonstrat-
ing that diverse audiences can and are motivated to acquire and 
utilize the skills of practicing various forms of mindfulness.224 
This Article advocates boosts that enable people to im-
prove decision-making competencies by thinking more mindfully, 
systematically, and effectively. 
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D. Soft Paternalism versus Positive Parentonomics 
Lengthened retirement periods and changing U.S. demo-
graphics resulting from aging heighten the importance of improving 
decision-making because older Americans are particularly vul-
nerable to financial decision errors.225 Defaulting people into 401(k) 
retirement plans exemplifies the idea of what is known as soft 
paternalism,226 which includes libertarian paternalism that pre-
serves freedom of choice, while influencing choices to make people 
better off;227 asymmetric paternalism that produces large bene-
fits for those prone to decision-making errors, while imposing small 
costs on those not so prone;228 cautious paternalism that requires 
policymakers to determine precise conditions under which bene-
fits outweigh costs;229 and light paternalism that enhances indi-
vidual choice without restricting it.230 
All the above types of soft paternalism share the common 
feature of modifying the decision-making contexts that people face 
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in order to improve the outcomes resulting from people’s unmod-
ified, existing decision-making.231 None of these forms of soft 
paternalism attempts to improve the actual process of people’s 
decision-making. Each of these versions of soft paternalism is thus 
open to legal scholar and philosopher Jeremy Waldron’s criticism: 
Choice architects nudge almost everything I choose and 
do, and this is complemented by the independent activity of 
marketers and salesmen, who nudge ... furiously for their own 
benefit. I’m not sure I want to live in a nudge-world, though—
as a notoriously poor chooser—I appreciate the good-hearted 
and intelligent efforts of choice architects such as Sunstein to 
make my autonomous life a little better. I wish, though, that I 
could be made a better chooser rather than having someone on 
high take advantage (even for my own benefit) of my current 
thoughtlessness and my shabby intuitions.232 
A new type of soft paternalism, known as autonomy-
enhancing paternalism (AEP), aims to “support individuals’ abil-
ity to make autonomous decisions,”233 defining autonomy234 as “‘the 
capacity of a person ... to reflect upon, and then attempt to accept or 
change his or her preferences, desires, values, and ideals.’”235 AEP 
“acknowledges that behavioral interventions can—and typically 
will—change the strength of decision-making anomalies over time, 
and favors those interventions that improve, rather than reduce, 
individuals’ ability to make critically reflected, unbiased, auton-
omous decisions.”236 AEP advocates “using behavioral insights to 
modify the choice architecture in a way that promotes critical re-
flection”237 and focuses on “helping individuals to become better 
decision makers; it aims to improve well-being through improving 
the processes of decision-making. This is in contrast to other forms 
                                                                                                            
231 See Holt, supra note 226, at E16. 
232 Jeremy Waldron, It’s All for Your Own Good, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 9, 
2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/09/cass-sunstein-its 
-all-your-own-good/ [http://perma.cc/4QD7-QDJF] (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (2014)). 
233 Martin Binder & Leonhard K. Lades, Autonomy-Enhancing Paternal-
ism, 68 KYKLOS 3, 4 (2015). 
234 RONALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 48 (Sydney 
Shoemaker et al. eds., 1988). 
235 Binder & Lades, supra note 233, at 5 (quoting DWORKIN, supra note 234, 
at 48). 
236 Id. at 4. 
237 Id. at 6. 
2018] BOOST: IMPROVING MINDFULNESS 169 
of soft paternalism that aim to improve the outcomes of decision-
making processes without concerning themselves with how the 
decisions come about.”238 AEP entails “interventions that change 
the choice architecture to help individuals to become good decision-
makers, who are able to ... make critically reflected decisions.”239 
AEP realizes that “interventions can influence individuals’ abilities 
to learn about both their cognitive biases and their preferences240 ... 
[and] prefers cognitive learning over non-cognitive learning because 
the latter often happens without the individual being aware of it 
and is thus more open to manipulation and the influence of oth-
er[s] ....”241 AEP “encourages those behavioral interventions that 
help individuals to become better decision-makers and thus make 
better informed, less biased, and more autonomous choices over 
time that may better reflect their true preferences.”242 AEP 
transforms choice contexts with a goal of improving people’s 
decision-making processes.243 
This Article focuses on additional ways to improve decision-
making competencies by democratizing practicing mindfulness 
and thinking tools.244 This Article advances the notion of positive 
parentonomics,245 extending positive parentalism,246 an original 
regulatory proposal advocating that policymakers “develop[ ] 
institutions ... [to] help enable [people,] ... communities[, and 
societies] to flourish and thrive.”247 Instead of negative and gen-
dered connotations that come with paternalism and the idea of 
“father knows best,” positive parentalism entails positive and 
gender-neutral notions of parenting in fostering people to choose 
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wisely across many different choice settings.248 Positive paren-
tonomics is based on an optimistic view of humanity because it 
believes that people can improve their decision-making skills and 
focuses on helping people do so in order to lead happier and more 
meaningful lives.249 Positive parentonomics advocates that soci-
eties can and should empower people to flourish and thrive by 
facilitating people learning to make better decisions by fostering 
people practicing mindfulness and employing thinking boosts, 
including thinking technologies and diversity.250 
E. Intellectual Virtues 
Many boosts involve teaching and learning different mind-
sets or ways of thinking to improve decision-making competen-
cies.251 While such boosts differ in details, they share the common 
feature of being more likely to be successful if people are motivated 
and engaged to learn.252 Loyola Marymount University philosophy 
professor, Jason Baehr, defines intellectual virtues to be “deep per-
sonal qualities or character strengths required for good thinking 
and learning.”253 Baehr proposes these nine foundational intel-
lectual virtues254: curiosity, intellectual autonomy, intellectual 
humility, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual tho-
roughness, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual 
tenacity. Baehr divides these intellectual virtues into three 
groups.255 First are intellectual virtues necessary to motivate the 
process of learning and towards the right direction: curiosity, 
intellectual autonomy, and intellectual humility.256 Second are 
intellectual virtues necessary to maintain the process of learning on 
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the right path: attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, and intel-
lectual thoroughness.257 Third are intellectual virtues necessary to 
surmount learning challenges and obstacles: open-mindedness, 
intellectual courage, and intellectual tenacity.258 
Curiosity is a source of intrinsic intellectual motivation and 
consists of wondering, pondering, and asking why questions. In-
tellectual autonomy entails an active willingness, courage, and abil-
ity to think for yourself.259 Intellectual humility means an alertness 
towards, and a willingness to admit, intellectual limitations, mis-
takes, and weaknesses.260 Attentiveness involves being present, 
active listening, and focused observation about important details.261 
Intellectual carefulness facilitates “avoiding intellectual 
errors or mistakes, [such as] false beliefs and ignorance.”262 In-
tellectual thoroughness means a disposition to probe for deeper 
meaning and understanding in acquiring and communicating 
knowledge.263 Open-mindedness is a willingness and ability to 
consider alternative viewpoints, revise beliefs, and think outside the 
proverbial box.264 Intellectual courage is readiness to take intel-
lectual risks by persisting in thinking when there is fear of em-
barrassment or failure.265 Intellectual perseverance is a “tendency 
[and willingness] to embrace intellectual challenge and struggle.”266 
In a 563-page resource guide,267 Baehr provides an over-
view about intellectual virtues,268 in addition to a closer examina-
tion of each intellectual virtue, with examples of each from history 
(e.g., Copernicus and Galileo) and literature (e.g., Jane Eyre and 
Hermione Granger), that includes discussion questions: curiosity,269 
intellectual autonomy,270 intellectual humility,271 attentiveness,272 
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intellectual carefulness,273 intellectual thoroughness,274 open-
mindedness,275 intellectual courage,276 and intellectual tenacity.277 
Baehr offers a number of practices to foster intellectual virtues out-
side classroom settings278 and inside classroom settings.279 Baehr 
also discusses how to measure growth in intellectual virtues.280 
II. MINDFULNESS 
Much of the current interest and popularity about being 
more mindful among athletes,281 businesses282 (such as Google283), 
law schools and lawyers,284 organizations285 (such as the mili-
tary286), and laypeople287 is due to psychological and neuroscience 
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studies finding that being more mindful improves physical health, 
mental health, and well-being,288 cultivates emotional intelli-
gence,289 reduces anxiety and stress,290 and improves focus and 
productivity.291 
Whether mindfulness leads to more ethical behavior depends 
upon one’s precise definition of mindfulness and exactly what one is 
mindful about.292 If mindfulness is defined as paying attention in a 
caring, discerning, and open-hearted way, with kind curiosity to 
ourselves, others, and our environment, instead of just paying bare 
attention, then such a definition contains an intention of caring 
about ourselves, others, and our environment.293 People can also be 
narrow or wide in the scope of what people are mindful about.294 
A. Cognitive Biases as Forms of Mindlessness 
People often choose poorly when they act mindlessly or with-
out much awareness, as if acting on automatic pilot.295 It is cogni-
tively too demanding to pay attention to all the stimuli that people 
receive because attention is a finite, scarce resource.296 To what 
we pay attention is very often unconsciously determined.297 Psy-
chology professors Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons’ famous 
“invisible gorilla experiment”298 illustrates that people can exhibit 
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inattentional blindness resulting from paying selective attention. 
It is not possible to always be mindful of everything due to finite 
cognition.299 People can learn to choose to be mindful in their 
mindlessness.300 An example of the potential of being mindful 
about mindlessness is to form the habit of taking off one of your 
shoes and placing it on the floor of the backseat row near a baby’s 
child seat so that you will not mindlessly leave a baby locked in your 
car on a hot day because you will have to get your shoe before or 
immediately upon leaving your car.301 
Economics professor Xavier Gabaix proposes a tractable 
model of bounded rationality based on the theme of people hav-
ing limited attention.302 In his model, people (just like economists) 
create simplified models of the world and think about reality via 
their models.303 People’s models necessarily entail a representa-
tion of reality that is sparse,304 in the sense that only very few of 
the many possible parameters and variables of reality are repre-
sented as being nonzero.305 People only choose to pay attention to, 
or think about, those variables to which people assign nonzero val-
ues.306 In Gabaix’s model, people choose how much attention to pay 
to aspects of reality by balancing the benefits and costs of think-
ing.307 To avoid the infinite regress problem of thinking optimally 
about how much to think, Gabaix’s model makes the simplifying 
assumption that people’s utility losses from inattention are linear-
quadratic functions.308 The underlying intuition of Gabaix’s model 
is that people pay more attention to things that are more vola-
tile, matter more for their decisions, entail big losses if they make 
imperfect decisions, and if the psychic cost of paying attention is 
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low.309 The overarching idea of mindfulness is to develop the ability 
to be able to pay attention to those aspects of reality that matter 
in any given situation.310 Learning how to discern what matters is 
part of practicing mindfulness and meta-mindfulness.311 
Gabaix analyzes how numerous cognitive biases in behav-
ioral economics reflect a particular form of inattention,312 such 
as inattention to true prices and the shrouding of add-on costs,313 
inattention to taxes,314 neglected risks,315 hyperbolic discounting 
being global inattention to the future,316 prospect theory being 
inattention to true probabilities,317 overconfidence being inatten-
tion to one’s true ability,318 believing one’s beliefs to be more 
accurate than they are being inattention to the precision of one’s 
signals,319 underestimating the correlation between strategies in 
a game being attention to conditional probability,320 projection 
bias being local inattention to future circumstances by anchor-
ing on present circumstances,321 base-rate neglect being inatten-
tion to base probabilities,322 correlation neglect being inattention to 
correlation of random variables,323 insensitivity to sample size be-
ing inattention to sample size,324 over- and under-reaction to 
news being inattention to autocorrelation of a stochastic time 
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series,325 left-digit bias being inattention to non-leading digits,326 
exponential growth bias being inattention to compounding of inter-
est rates,327 and insensitivity to predictability, misconceptions of 
regression to the mean, and illusion of validity all being forms of 
inattention to the stochasticity of the world.328 
B. How Mindfulness Can Improve Decision-Making 
Experimental research finds that practicing mindfulness 
reduces these cognitive biases: affective impact bias,329 implicit age 
bias,330 implicit race bias,331 and sunk-cost bias.332 In addition, 
practicing mindfulness can reduce racially discriminatory behav-
ior333 and reduce pursuing personally costly vengeance or revenge 
in ultimatum games.334 More generally, practicing mindfulness 
can decrease the impact of cognitive biases by improving people’s 
decision-making through improving people’s moods and reducing 
people’s anxiety and negative affect.335 
Co-founder of the Civility Project at Johns Hopkins, Profes-
sor Forni, memorably states that “[m]istakes are bad choices we 
make when we are not ready to make good ones.”336 Soll, Milkman, 
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and Payne introduce a concept of decision readiness,337 in which 
a person’s System Two thinking338 is ready to monitor a person’s 
System One thinking,339 interrupt wrong judgments, and avoid 
wrong decisions. Being mindful facilitates decision readiness.340 
A way mindfulness meditation can improve decision-making 
is by allowing people to practice and get better at being mindful, 
which in turn can improve decision-making for all of the reasons 
discussed above.341 Another way that mindfulness meditation can 
improve decision-making is if mindfulness meditation reduces anxi-
ety and stress342 because there is evidence that “anxiety increases 
threat perception, which, in turn, results in self-interested unethical 
behaviors.”343 There is also evidence that just four days of mind-
fulness meditation training for twenty minutes per day can improve 
the ability to sustain attention, executive functioning, working 
memory, and visual-spatial processing of undergraduates,344 per-
haps as the result of reducing self-reported anxiety and fatigue.345 
More generally, mindfulness meditation can improve people’s deci-
sion-making by improving their decision readiness in the same 
ways that mindfulness can, as the above paragraph notes.346 
Professors Natalia Karelaia and Jochen Reb analyze how and 
when mindfulness can improve people’s decision-making.347 They 
divided up the process of decision-making into these four stages348: 
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(1) Decision Framing, (2) Information Gathering and Processing, (3) 
Making Conclusions, and (4) Learning from Feedback. 
Karelaia and Reb point out how mindfulness could hamper 
decision-making if additional options lead to cognitive overload, 
delay choice, or in the limit cause choice paralysis.349 The focus-
ing of attention to the present moment that mindfulness entails 
may also result in prioritizing immediate as opposed to long-term 
goals.350 A counterpoint is that practicing mindfulness helps people 
realize that their current thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations 
are only fleeting and temporary.351 This realization should lead 
people to appreciate that their present goals are likely to change 
in unpredictable ways.352 Being more mindful about, empathetic 
with, and sensitive to people’s future selves may also help people 
choose wisely regarding their future selves.353 
Being mindful can also help people discern the difference 
between important and necessary versus unimportant and un-
necessary decisions.354 Such discernment allows people to priori-
tize the choices they face and spend limited attentional, cognitive, 
and economic resources on consequential choices instead of wasting 
effort, time, and energy on micromanaging their lives.355 Judi-
ciously focusing on choices that matter also lowers the anxiety 
from being overwhelmed by having to make too many choices.356 
Mindfulness can help people realize when they should choose 
to stop continuing a plan of action.357 A correlational and three 
experimental studies358 found that increased mindfulness medi-
tation reduces irrational escalation of commitment by reducing the 
related sunk-cost bias,359 in which people continue a course of 
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action because of prior unrecoverable expenditures in effort, 
money, or time. A financial example of the sunk-cost effect is 
that many people find it hard to sell a stock whose price has 
dropped.360 Karelaia and Reb believe that another reason that 
mindfulness reduces irrational escalation of commitment is that 
mindfulness reduces ego involvement and personal attachment 
to past choices and uncomfortable feelings that result from criti-
cism of past choices.361 
Economics Nobel laureate Herbert Simon362 famously stated 
that attention is a scarce resource: 
In an information-rich world, the wealth of information 
means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is 
that information consumes. What information consumes is rather 
obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a 
wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need 
to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance 
of information sources that might consume it.363 
Mindfulness may result in less extensive information search 
because mindfulness itself entails heightened utilization of the 
limited cognitive resource of attention.364 The impact of such re-
duced scope of information search is unclear though because while 
there is the possibility of missing key decision-relevant information, 
there also is less negative affect from onerous information search 
and less reliance on external criteria for choice.365 
Mindfulness may help people become more aware of the 
uncertainties they face by reminding people of the impermanent 
and temporary nature of their bodily sensations, feelings, and 
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thoughts.366 Karelaia and Reb hypothesize that mindfulness can 
help people have an increased tolerance of uncertainty by detaching 
people from their feelings of unease with uncertainty.367 Mind-
fulness can lead people to realize if they engage in excessive 
information search and redirect their efforts more productively 
elsewhere.368 Mindfulness can reduce illusory pattern detection, 
which is particularly likely when people feel a lack of control.369 
Mindfulness practice can mitigate many of the difficulties of learn-
ing from experience that this Article detailed earlier,370 if Karelaia 
and Reb are correct that “mindful decision makers are more likely 
to learn from feedback and importantly, learn the right lessons.”371 
Mindfulness can lead to compassion and self-compassion.372 
Leah Weiss teaches a course at the Stanford University Graduate 
School of Business titled Leading with Mindfulness and Compas-
sion.373 The course “is based on the theory that a compassionate 
attitude can significantly reduce the distress people feel in difficult 
situations, as well as make you a better leader.”374 Compassionate 
business leaders can change toxic work environments.375 There 
is recent evidence that self-compassion improves problem-solving, 
resilience after failure, and quality of life, while it decreases anxiety, 
depression, and stress.376 
Finally, and importantly for law,377 practicing mindful-
ness can lead to individual development and societal reform.378 
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Gretchen Ki Steidle believes that personal transformation and 
social change are both crucial for a just society.379 Steidle is the 
founder380 and president381 of Global Grassroots,382 an interna-
tional non-profit organization whose defining “mission is to cata-
lyze women and girls as leaders of Conscious Social Change in their 
communities.”383 The phrase Conscious Social Change refers to “a 
design methodology that employs mindfulness throughout the pro-
cess of designing a social solution.”384 Conscious Social Change385 
consists of these five capacities and associated guiding questions386: 
 
1) Cultivating Presence: What is happening? 387 
2) Becoming Whole: What is True?388 
3) Ensuring Well-Being: What is needed?389 
4) Engaging Mindfully: What is helpful?390 
5) Leading from Within: What is possible?391 
 
Steidle reviews the neuroscience and psychotherapeutic evi-
dence demonstrating the benefits of mindfulness.392 Steidle details 
how mindfulness helps people to become better change agents and 
leaders, who are able to create more sustainable solutions, forge 
stronger relationships, and inspire change in others.393 Steidle 
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lists and describes organizations that integrate mindfulness into 
social change.394 Steidle presents mindfulness practices for indi-
viduals and groups.395 
III. THINKING BOOSTS 
This part of the Article analyzes structured ways to think 
better and more systematically by utilizing thinking tools that 
people may be unfamiliar with, namely thinking architecture and 
thinking technologies.396 Pen, paper, stylus, and tablet are familiar 
thinking tools.397 As a humorous television commercial states, 
though: “[t]he wrong tools can only take you so far.”398 There 
should be less resistance towards efforts at increasing people’s 
thinking because few people should claim that they are just not 
thinking people.399 In the movie, Bridge of Spies,400 a character 
says: “Sometimes people think wrong. People are people.” Shlomo 
Benartzi and John Payne introduce the phrase “thinking archi-
tecture,” which is “a structured process that allows us to break 
down a complex problem, such as what to do in retirement, into a 
series of manageable thinking steps, so as to improve outcomes.”401 
Thinking architecture differs from traditional checklists402 as each 
step in thinking architecture “is designed to deal with a particular 
behavioral challenge or mental blind spot ... to fortify the weakest 
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parts of the mind.”403 In a sense, thinking architecture is a low 
technology version of thinking technology.404 
There is experimental evidence that even a twenty-five-
minute training session on statistical reasoning (specifically, the 
law of large numbers) significantly increased the frequency and 
quality of people applying statistical reasoning to a wide range 
of everyday life problems that were outside the context of the 
training.405 These problems included scenarios that are not usu-
ally viewed in terms of probabilities, such as whether a person’s 
personality can be inferred from first impressions,406 whether the 
performance of group members can be predicted from the per-
formance of one of its members,407 choosing which of two colleges 
to attend,408 hiring an actress for the lead in a Broadway play,409 
how to determine if you like Chinese food,410 and how to figure 
out if you like vacations.411 
A. Thinking Technologies 
This part of the Article considers various engaging and 
fun technologies that can help people think better and in so doing 
improve their decision-making. Virtual reality simulations can im-
prove the accuracy of people’s perceptions of their future selves 
by helping people learn how their current decisions and behavior 
shape their future selves.412 Behavioral economist Colin Camerer 
suggested that “computer morphing of a body image could be used 
to show a person, for example, what they would look like in one 
year if they continue their steady diet of fast food or, oppositely, 
if they stuck with their personal trainer three times a week for a 
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year.”413 Regulators could mandate that fast food restaurants 
provide a hologram projection of what a customer might look like as 
they age if they regularly ate healthy versus unhealthy items.414 
Experimental studies have found evidence of a phenomenon 
known as the Proteus effect, where people infer their expected 
behaviors and attitudes based upon observing their avatar’s 
appearance, and conform their online behavior to their digital self-
representations independent of how others perceive them.415 In 
one study, people assigned to more attractive avatars in immer-
sive virtual environments engaged in more self-disclosure than 
subjects assigned to less attractive avatars.416 In another study, 
those assigned taller avatars behaved more confidently in nego-
tiating than others assigned shorter avatars.417 The effects in these 
studies have been found to extend to an actual online community 
and subsequent face-to-face interactions.418 
Serious games are games that “have an explicit and care-
fully thought-out educational purpose and are not intended to be 
played primarily for amusement.”419 Simulation games should be 
more effective than alternative instructional methods according 
to interactive cognitive complexity theory because simulation games 
engage people’s cognitive and affective processes simultaneously.420 
A meta-analysis examining data on 6,476 individuals in 65 studies 
finds people trained by computer-based simulation games had 20 
percent more self-efficacy, 14 percent more skill-based knowledge 
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level, 11 percent more factual knowledge level, and 9 percent higher 
retention rate than people in control groups.421 
Some professions have begun to explore the use of serious 
games to teach contextualized decision-making skills. A medical 
simulation computer video game, JDoc, “immerses the player in 
the believable world of a busy hospital at night and educates them 
as to the diagnostic procedures and medical criteria required while 
working on-call in a hospital ward.”422 JDoc provides an engag-
ing way for junior doctors to learn communication skills, decision-
making skills, diagnostic and medical procedures, interpersonal 
skills, and medical information.423 Another virtual environment 
serious game,424 DREAD-ED (Disaster Readiness through Edu-
cation), is a cooperative multiplayer game designed to teach 
communication and group decision-making skills to emergency 
management personnel.425 A company called Knack426 develops 
app-based video games that provide various measures of a player’s 
character, decision-making, emotional/social intelligence, lead-
ership, mindset, and thinking.427 Human resources departments 
can utilize such information to avoid cognitive biases in their hiring 
processes.428 People can utilize such information to increase their 
self-awareness and choose professions that fit their strengths.429 
Serious games can train players to recognize and mitigate 
cognitive biases in decision-making.430 A video adventure game 
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called Missing: The Pursuit of Terry Hughes431 incorporates an 
engaging storyline about Terry, “a gregarious, well-liked figure 
with an extravagant social life”432 who goes missing. Terry’s brother 
Chris becomes worried when she disappears and asks her neighbor, 
the player of the game, to look around Terry’s apartment for clues 
about why Terry is missing.433 This game moves a player through 
these four instructive phases: (1) eliciting a target cognitive bias 
in a naturalistic scenario, (2) examining a player’s actions or ask-
ing a player questions to determine if a cognitive bias happened, 
(3) providing feedback to a player about whether a player avoided 
or exhibited a cognitive bias, and (4) reinforcing a player’s under-
standing of a cognitive bias by providing other examples that 
highlight similar cognitive bias aspects and contexts.434 
It should be unsurprising that learning to recognize and 
mitigate cognitive biases are crucial skills for intelligence ana-
lysts.435 Players of this game achieved statistically significant 
immediate increases in their knowledge about cognitive biases, 
by 37 percent for students and 44 percent for analysts.436 The 
immediate bias mitigation effects were improvements of 25 per-
cent for students and 27 percent for analysts.437 Of the players who 
completed follow-up testing after eight weeks, cognitive bias knowl-
edge retention decreased from 37 percent to 25 percent among 
students and from 39 percent to 26 percent among analysts, while 
bias mitigation decreased from 29 percent to 28 percent among 
students and from 27 percent to 20 percent among analysts.438 
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A different version of the game, Missing: The Final Secret,439 
taught players about recognizing and mitigating these other cog-
nitive biases: anchoring bias (“overweighting the first information 
primed or considered in subsequent judgment”440), social projection 
bias (“assuming others’ emotions, thoughts, and values are similar 
to one’s own”441), and representativeness bias (“using the similarity 
of an outcome to a prototypical outcome to judge its probability”442). 
Players of this version “exonerate their employer of a crimi-
nal charge and uncover the criminal activity of her accusers.”443 
Players of this game experienced immediate medium to large 
debiasing effects that persisted at least two months later and these 
“effects were domain-general: bias reduction occurred across prob-
lems in different contexts, and problem formats that were taught 
and not taught in the interventions.”444 
Recent research with an experimental empathy training 
video game, Crystals of Kaydor, found that adolescents who played 
daily for two weeks had increased connectivity in their brain net-
works that are linked to empathy and perspective, with some dis-
playing altered neural networks related to emotion regulation.445 
University of Denver computer science professor and chair, 
Scott Leutenegger,446 and University of Denver electronic media 
art & design and digital media studies professor Rafael Fajardo447 
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coined the phrase “humane games” to encompass (1) games for 
change, (2) games for health, and (3) games for education.448 Two 
examples of humane games simulate opposing cultural realities 
and perspectives at the United States–Mexico border, specifically 
at El Paso–Ciudad Juarez: in Crosser™,449 reminiscent of the 
arcade classic Frogger™, a player attempts to illegally cross the 
river/border and in La Migra™,450 inspired by the arcade classic 
Space Invaders™, a player is a border patrol agent of the United 
States Immigration and Naturalization Service who attempts to 
prevent illegal entry. These socially conscious games exemplify 
video games as “vehicles and venues for cultural commentary and 
criticism.”451 Other humane games concern blame shifting back 
and forth between political parties,452 rescuing civilians,453 dec-
imation of numbats in Australia due to the invasive species, the 
European Red Fox,454 and the 2009 recession.455 
Professors Sara Konrath, Brad Bushman, Rich Tolman, and 
Matthew Winslow utilized evidence-based techniques in creating 
the Random App of Kindness (RAKi) to increase the development 
of empathic habits in teenagers (ages ten to seventeen).456 RAKi 
is a collection of nine smartphone mini-games.457 Initially, three 
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games are available to a player: Match the Emotion teaches a 
player to improve recognition of emotions in other people’s faces 
by matching eyes, noses, and mouths on cartoon faces to specific 
emotions.458 Water the Venus Fly Trap teaches a player to inhibit a 
dominant response by instructing a player to water an animated 
plant as quickly as possible and stop as quickly as possible upon 
being prompted to not water that plant.459 Stop the Baby from 
Crying teaches a player empathy by figuring out what a crying 
baby needs and giving it to the baby.460 Upon completing a mini-
game successfully three times, another mini-game is unlocked.461 
Help the Old Woman across the Street teaches a player the cogni-
tive form of empathy of role or perspective taking by presenting the 
visual point of view of an old woman crossing a street.462 Upon 
completing another mini-game successfully three times, another 
mini-game is unlocked.463 Dance! teaches a player to develop pro-
sociality by dancing in sync with a character.464 Upon completing a 
third mini-game successfully three times, another mini-game is 
unlocked.465 Pet the Dog teaches a player empathy by gently 
stroking a dog and cleaning her fur to transform her from being sad 
to happy.466 Upon completing a fourth mini-game successfully 
three times, another mini-game is unlocked.467 Tracing Expres-
sions teaches a player empathy by tracing a character’s facial 
expressions.468 Upon completing a fifth mini-game successfully 
three times, another mini-game is unlocked.469 Angry Man teaches 
a player anger management and impulse control by calmly walking 
away quickly from an angry man yelling unintelligibly.470 A bonus 
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game Balloons has a player choose between being more prosocial 
or more self-focused.471 Preliminary data analyses found teens ran-
domly assigned to play RAKi for two months displayed empathic 
emotional responses to someone in distress and had less aggressive 
beliefs and behaviors compared with teens who played a control 
game for two months.472 Boys who played RAKi were more than 
three times more likely to help someone in distress than those who 
did not.473 Most girls were, independent of playing RAKi, already 
willing to help.474 
Because serious games and humane games are games, they 
can harness and leverage people’s desire to play and effectively 
reframe learning from being an onerous chore to a fun, enjoyable 
experience.475 A similar phenomenon occurs when people are 
motivated to engage in aerobic exercise by playing video games 
that involve people moving and becoming physically active.476 
B. Diversity 
Much of the discussion about diversity focuses on identity 
diversity, that is differences in people’s cultural identities, de-
mographic attributes, ethnicities, expertise, geographic locations 
and/or origins, occupations, race, religion, sexual orientation, physi-
cal abilities, socioeconomic status, and training.477 Identity diversity 
is correlated with another notion of diversity, namely cognitive di-
versity, which refers to differences in how people think about and 
process problems.478 Cognitive diversity479 consists of differences in 
cognitive repertories,480 which consist of these five components: 
information481 (e.g., data, facts), knowledge482 (e.g., understanding, 
                                                                                                            
471 Id. 
472 Id. 
473 Id. 
474 Id. 
475 See MICHAEL & CHEN, supra note 419, at 21. 
476 Huang, supra note 95, at 314, n. 397. 
477 SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIVERSITY BONUS: HOW GREAT TEAMS PAY OFF IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 54 (2017). 
478 See id. 
479 See PAGE, supra note 58, at 314. 
480 PAGE, supra note 477, at 52–67. 
481 Id. at 56–57. 
482 Id. at 57–58. 
2018] BOOST: IMPROVING MINDFULNESS 191 
structure), heuristics or algorithms483 (e.g., differential diagnosis, 
recipes), representations,484 which consist of perspectives485 (e.g., 
alphabetical order or chronological order) and categorizations486 
(e.g., west coast, east coast, midwestern, and southern), and mental 
models (e.g., econometric models, weather forecasting). Fostering 
cognitive diversity encourages cross-learning and group syner-
gies.487 Identity diversity is correlated with, and can improve organ-
izational thinking through, cognitive diversity. For example, cul-
tural experimental psychological research finds differences in 
the cognition, perception, reasoning, and thinking of East Asian 
cultures compared to western cultures.488 
Research in complex systems, economics, and political sci-
ence reveals that diversity can play a myriad of roles in organi-
zations and societies, including providing benefits, such as improved 
productivity, and creating costs, such as potential miscommuni-
cation.489 Much of this research is the work of Scott Page, the 
Leonid Hurwicz Collegiate Professor of Complex Systems, Politi-
cal Science, and Economics at the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor.490 Page and economist Lu Hong prove several theorems 
providing conditions under which cognitive diversity improves 
upon individual ability.491 In nontechnical language, the diversity 
prediction theorem implies the prediction of a group of people 
has to be always at least as good as the average prediction of the 
group’s members.492 How much better a group’s prediction is than 
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the average prediction depends on how much cognitive diversity 
that group has.493 A group just as bad at predicting as its aver-
age member must not have any cognitive diversity.494 A group 
much better at predicting than its average member must have a 
large degree of cognitive diversity.495 Cognitive diversity offers a 
counter to groupthink.496 
Page demonstrates how cognitive diversity offers everyone 
the benefits of improved creativity, decision-making, innovation, 
prediction, problem-solving, and productivity.497 Page details pre-
cisely how and why organizations and societies can benefit from 
cognitive diversity.498 Page develops policy implications about how 
organizations can improve their admissions, appointment, and hir-
ing decisions.499 In doing so, Page “moves us way beyond accept-
ing diversity as a matter of taste”500 to “help establish ‘a science 
of difference.’”501 Page’s more recent, less mathematical, and more 
approachable book502 presents empirical evidence of,503 and the 
business case for,504 diversity bonuses that result from more accu-
rate predictions, more effective problem solving, increased crea-
tivity, better verification of truth, improved strategizing, and deeper 
and broader evaluations.505 
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Diversity bonuses are less likely for manual tasks and rou-
tine cognitive tasks.506 Diversity bonuses are more likely when 
tasks are cognitive and non-routine.507 Thus, knowledge economy 
tasks that are complex, high-dimensional, and indecomposable 
into simpler components, are very likely to have large diversity 
bonuses.508 In her commentary about diversity bonuses, Colum-
bia Business School Paul Calello Professor of Leadership and 
Ethics Katherine W. Phillips points out how the mere presence 
of identity diversity can produce diversity bonuses in three addi-
tional ways rather than directly through cognitive diversity.509 
First, seeing identity diversity facilitates the consideration and 
expression of cognitive diversity.510 Second, identity diversity can 
reduce conformity with others of the same identity and in doing 
so result in everybody voicing unique perspectives more confi-
dently.511 Third, a desire to maintain social ties with similar 
identity individuals can increase discussion of differing opinions, 
information, and knowledge.512 
Research in psychology and neuroscience shows how the 
social dynamics and forces of competition, cooperation, and power 
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can exacerbate or inhibit discrimination, prejudice, and stereotyp-
ing.513 Much of this research is due to Susan Fiske, the Eugene 
Higgins Professor of Psychology at Princeton University.514 It is 
cognitively less demanding for people to categorize other people 
particularly by such observable attributes as age, gender, and 
race than it is for people to learn about other people as individu-
als because such learning requires motivation.515 Fiske shows that 
being members of a team or depending upon another person 
motivates people to go past stereotyping.516 Positive psychology 
suggests how to design legal policies that promote identity diversi-
ty,517 including how courts can facilitate the design of employer 
antidiscrimination programs to have greater effectiveness.518 Re-
search in behavioral economics, communication studies, diffusion 
studies, network systems, social marketing, and psychology can 
inform the design of policies that increase identity diversity.519 
CONCLUSION 
This Article analyzes three policies to improve people’s 
decision-making: doing nothing, nudging, and boosting. This Article 
focused on three boosts: mindfulness, thinking technologies, and 
diversity. This Article advocates that societies facilitate the practice 
of mindfulness to improve people’s decision-making competencies. 
This Article also advocates that societies facilitate people utilizing 
thinking technologies to make better decisions. This Article finally 
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advocates that organizations and societies should foster identity 
diversity and inclusion. Societies can and should facilitate prac-
ticing mindfulness, utilizing thinking technologies, and identity 
diversity by educating people about and providing people with 
opportunities to directly experience first-hand mindfulness, think-
ing technologies, and identity diversity.520 Offering people op-
portunities to warm up to or warm onto mindfulness, thinking 
technologies, and identity diversity are likely to convince many 
people of the benefits and efficacy of mindfulness, thinking tech-
nologies, and identity diversity in improving decision-making 
competencies in many situations across many domains.521 
All three proposals exemplify promulgating learning ar-
chitectures that allow people to better learn how to think about 
and make decisions.522 All three proposals do not require, force, 
or make people do anything.523 All three proposals also differ 
from choice architecture and information architecture in explic-
itly focusing on and analyzing how to effectively teach people to 
learn how to improve their decision-making processes.524 Instead 
of assuming or believing that people’s decision-making abilities 
are fixed or too expensive to improve, this Article adopts and 
advocates that societies and people adopt growth mindsets about 
people’s decision-making skills.525 
This Article advocates that government should fund addi-
tional basic and applied research about how, when, why, and 
under what conditions various forms of mindfulness, particular 
thinking technologies, and identity diversity can improve decision-
making. There is widespread interest already about mindfulness, 
thinking technologies, and identity diversity among businesses 
and the public.526 
Mindfulness is not expensive to practice and thus is ac-
cessible to all.527 Concerns exist over how large the benefits to 
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mindfulness are, whether there are drawbacks or downsides to 
mindfulness practice for some, and if a secularized version of 
mindfulness lacks a crucial ethical component.528 Many people 
who are financially comfortable already have access to some version 
of and guided training about mindfulness.529 This Article advo-
cates the democratization of mindfulness to enable people who 
are disadvantaged, disempowered, or poor to also have access to 
some version of and guided training about mindfulness. Thinking 
architecture is also inexpensive to employ and can be accessible 
to many people.530 Decision researchers can and should empiri-
cally investigate whether different populations who learn about 
thinking architectures choose wisely in sustainable ways across 
diverse situations.531 Thinking technologies vary from inexpensive 
mobile apps to expensive virtual reality simulators.532 Government 
can subsidize the development, dissemination, and consumer adop-
tion of humane games for change, health, and education, and seri-
ous games teaching people to recognize and mitigate cognitive 
biases.533 As with mindfulness, many people who are financially 
comfortable already have access to thinking tools for themselves 
and their kids.534 This Article advocates the democratization of 
thinking technologies to enable people who are disadvantaged, 
disempowered, or poor to also have access to thinking technolo-
gies. This Article advocates the dissemination of information 
about benefits from identity diversity and cognitive diversity in 
organizations and society. 
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Ideally, societies will one day teach all kids in primary 
schools about the importance and value of mindfulness, thinking 
technologies, and identity diversity.535 Societies should then con-
tinue teaching students in secondary schools more in depth about 
mindfulness, thinking technologies, and identity diversity.536 Until 
that day and possibly even after then, colleges, professional schools, 
and continuing professional education programs can and should 
teach their students about the benefits of mindfulness, thinking 
technologies, and identity diversity in particular areas of spe-
cialization and professional decision-making domains.537 
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